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WORD GAMES, WAR GAMES
Diane H. Mazur*

DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY.
By Janet E. Halley. Durham: Duke University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv,
159. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95.
In 1993, the country's interest in the issue of military service by gay
citizens escalated to a level that can only be described as a national
obsession, and "obsession" is by no means too strong a term. The
subject of gay servicemembers was debated within all three branches
of government, all ranks of the military, and all walks of civilian life.1
The issue of military service by gay citizens became a line in the sand,
a cultural standoff on issues as sensitive and disparate as sexuality, pa
triotism, civil rights, and civic obligation.
Janet Halley2 returns to that time of obsession in Don't: A
Reader's Guide to the Military's Anti-Gay Policy. The title derives, of
course, from "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the popular name reflective of
a somewhat simplified understanding of the military policy that even
tually emerged from the debate. Halley's work compiles a painstaking
and meticulous "archaeology" (p. 14) of the layers of influence that
progressively shaped the nature of the military's policy on gay service
members, from the earliest days of President Clinton's intention to lift
the ban through the final statutory codification of what is still de
scribed, perhaps misleadingly, as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." In ex
plaining the process by which "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" became the
legacy of a failed attempt to end the exclusion of gay citizens from na
tional service, Halley unearths its interpretive history "controversy by
controversy, line by line, and at times even word by word" (p. 14).
The centerpiece of Don't is the firm conclusion that the present
policy is "much, much worse" for gay servicemembers than the policy
in effect when President Clinton assumed office (p. 1). In answering
the question "What went wrong?," Halley seeks to trace cause and ef
fect to discover the independent semantic influences that were
brought to bear on the 1993 policy revisions. Potential sources of in
fluence - President Clinton, Congress, the military, legal challenges
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. Visiting Professor of Law, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, 2000-01. J.D. 1988, University of Texas. Captain,
United States Air Force, 1979-83. Ed.
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1. See Steven Waldman, The Battle ofthe Gay Ban, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 42.
2. Professor of Law and Robert E. Paradise Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School.
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brought by gay servicemembers, defenses to those challenges crafted
by the Department of Justice, and judicial rulings in response to those
challenges and defenses - are investigated and assigned varying
amounts of blame for acts of commission or omission that, in Halley's
view, led to the enactment of the more burdensome "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell."
It is undoubtedly true that the climate for gay servicemembers has
become much, much worse since the 1993 debate.3 That change in
climate, however, has very little to do with the intricate legal seman
tics, scope, or substance of the legislative. revisions leading to "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell." The legacy of the failed debate is not a statute that
is in scope or substance any different from the previous policy; rather,
it is a military with a greater institutional commitment to enforcing the
exclusionary policy.
Halley's archaeology is as important for its unintentional illustra
tions as it is for its intentional ones. Its exhaustive chronology of years
of legal advocacy on behalf of gay servicemembers is illuminating
more for what it fails to find than for what it does find. It reveals, but
only in a between-the-lines fashion, an important aspect of "What
went wrong?" in the attempt to bury a policy of exclusion. This un
examined factor is the failure to understand the institutional context
of the military, or the practical, factual ways in which military policy
impacts the lives of gay servicemembers.
The door to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as the prevailing under
standing of a gay citizen's opportunity for national service was first
cracked opened, surprisingly, by legal advocates for gay plaintiffs.
Years before President Clinton's involvement precipitated a more
acute controversy, those seeking to overturn the ban had already initi
ated a high-stakes legal game of "chicken" with the military over its
exclusionary policy.4 This was a game in which both sides seemed con
tent to trade legal arguments confined to less-than-honest semantics
- "word games" - rather than engage each, other on a level that
would recognize the practical effect their efforts would have on gay
servicemembers. In this battle of word games, gay servicemembers
were ultimately the only losers, and Halley's book is an accidental ar
chaeology of this strategic conflict as well.

3. See SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE
FIFTH ANNUA L REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE," (Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.sldn.org/reports/fifthl> (documenting increases in anti-gay harassment, viola
tions of investigatory restrictions, and discharges of gay personnel in the years since "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" was enacted).
4. See Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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UNDERSTANDING THE RULES OF THE GAME

The twin linchpins of the legal controversy concerning military
service by gay citizens have been the words "status" and "conduct" their meaning, their distinction, and their correlation with each other.
It is shameful that such an important issue of civic obligation should
be decided on the interpretation of two small words, but these two
words now constitute the whole of the debate.
Halley's archaeology begins when the issue became a matter of
public concern: when President Clinton declared his intention, shortly
after his inauguration, to end the categorical exclusion of gay citizens
from military service. The common understanding of Clinton's objec
tive was that a better, fairer policy would "mark[] the end of dis
charging servicemembers for their status and the beginning of dis
charging them for their conduct" (p. 1). Under such a policy,
servicemembers would be sanctioned not for "who they are" (in other
words, simply because they are gay) but instead for "what they do" (if
they behave in a way harmful to the military mission) (p. 1).
As Halley explains, one rational way to illustrate the difference be
tween a policy based on status and one based on conduct would be to
highlight the significance of misconduct in a military environment (p.
35). Acts of misconduct such as sexual harassment or sexual assault,
for example ("what they do"), would be punishable whether commit
ted by straight or gay servicemembers ("who they are"); individuals
who do not engage in misconduct and who are otherwise qualified
should be equally eligible to serve. This simple and intuitive under
standing of the relationship between concepts of status and conduct,
however, was fleeting and largely disregarded during the debate, de
spite President Clinton's naively persistent belief that a misconduct
oriented policy would be the central objective of any revision.5
Once any rational distinction between "who they are" and "what
they do" is lost, concepts of status and conduct can be manipulated to
justify exclusion as easily as to justify inclusion. Halley observes that
"[e]very moving part of the new policy is designed to look like conduct
regulation in order to hide the fact that it turns decisively on status"
(p. 2). "What actually emerged from the legislative process was a
complex new set of regulations that discharge people on grounds that

5. See, e.g., The Transition: Excerpts from President-E/ect's News Conference in
Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at AlS ("[T]he issue ought to be conduct. Has
anybody done anything which would disqualify them, whether it's [the] Tailhook Scandal or
something else."); William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and
Lesbians in the Military, in 29 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1369,
1370 (1993) ("The policy I am announcing today is, in my judgment, the right thing to do and
the best way to do it. It is right because it provides greater protection to those who happen
to be homosexual and want to serve their country honorably in uniform, obeying all the
military's rules against sexual misconduct.").
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tie status to conduct and conduct to status in surprising, devious, in
genious, perverse, and frightening ways" (p. 4).
How was such a simple and intuitive understanding of the relation
ship between status and conduct lost? How did the definition of con
duct become so malleable and elusive that it could no longer be distin
guished from status? Because the thesis of Don't follows an intricate
semantic path through the language of military policy, any review
must set out at least the beginning and the end of the exercise - the
language of the regulatory and statutory schemes that defined the
military's treatment of gay servicemembers both before and after the
origin of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Only then can the book's claim
that the current policy is "much, much worse than its predecessor" (p.
1) be put in context.
The military's policy concerning gay servicemembers prior to its
reexamination during the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate was incor
porated in the Department of Defense regulation6 that Halley terms
"the Old DOD Policy" (pp. 19-20). The Old DOD Policy opened with
precatory language asserting a military necessity for the exclusion of
gay servicemembers: "Homosexuality is incompatible with military
service. The presence in the military environment of persons who en
gage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate
a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the
accomplishment of the military mission.m The operative section of
the regulation, however - the section setting out the elements that
had to be proved to discharge an individual - required the following
specific findings:
A member shall be separated under this section if one or more of the
following approved findings is made:
(1) The member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . .
(2) The member has stated that he or she is a homosexual . . . unless
there is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual . . .8
Two definitional sections in the Old DOD Policy elaborated on the
above disqualifying elements. A "homosexual act" was defined as
"bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between
members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires. "9
A "homosexual" was defined as "a person, regardless of sex, who en
gages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts."10
.

6. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. 1, § H (1994) (superseded).
7. § H(l)(a).
8. § H(l)(c)(l)-(2).
9. § H(l)(b)(3).
10. § H(l)(b)(l).
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Under this prior regulatory scheme, therefore, the military could
prove a basis for discharge in either of two ways. A servicemember
could be separated upon a finding that he or she committed a "homo
sexual act" (a "conduct" case) or made a statement acknowledging his
or her homosexuality (a "status" case).11 Halley describes the Old
DOD Policy as "explicitly status-based" (p. 3) in that an individual's
statement concerning his or her status ("that he or she is a homosex
ual") was service-disqualifying. Furthermore, the only defense to that
disqualifying statement was equally status-based, requiring the mili
tary to find that the individual "is not a homosexual."
The federal codification of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,''12 which
Halley terms "the Statute" (p. 20), largely tracks the Old DOD Policy
in its basic form. The Statute similarly disqualifies citizens from mili
tary service on the basis of certain acts and certain statements. It dif
fers, however, in its attempt to remove any connotation of status
regulation. The Statute seeks to limit the legal significance of terms
such as "homosexuality" and "homosexual,'' confining its reach to dis
qualifications that, in the military's view, can arguably be described as
what people do and not who they are:
(b) Policy. A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the
armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if
one or more of the following findings is made and approved in accor
dance with procedures set forth in such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solic
ited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . .
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bi
sexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding . . . that
the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who en
gages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or in
tends to engage in homosexual acts.13
A definitional section similarly elaborates on the operational ele
ments, with the same objective of removing status-based charges and
defenses:
(f) Definitions. - In this section:
(1) The term "homosexual" means a person, regardless of sex, who
engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or in
tends to engage in homosexual acts, and includes the terms "gay" or
"lesbian". [sic]
-

(3) The term "homosexual act" means -

11. "Status" cases may also be referred to as "statement" cases. The use of either in this
Review is synonymous.
12. 10 u.s.c. § 654 (1994).
13. 10 u.s.c. § 654(b)(l)-(2).
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(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted,
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sex
ual desires; and
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand
to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described
in subparagraph (A).14
A reader of the "before" and "after" versions of the military's
policy on service by gay citizens could not be faulted for failing to no
tice much of a difference. Acts of physical intimacy and statements
acknowledging homosexuality still constitute bases for discharge.
Disqualifying acts of intimacy, however, are now somewhat more
broadly defined. As Halley notes, a nonplatonic holding of hands with
someone of the same sex would support discharge from the military
under the Statute because it would "demonstrate a propensity" to en
gage in prohibited sexual conduct (p. 4), even though handholding
would not have constituted a "homosexual act" as previously defined.
A much more subtle textual revision was also made with respect to
"statement" or "status" cases. Under the Statute, a servicemember
who has made a statement acknowledging his or her homosexuality
can be retained in the military provided the servicemember can dem
onstrate that he or she has no propensity to engage in same-sex inti
macy; the servicemember does not need to prove, as under the Old
DOD Policy, that he or she is not a homosexual.
If one were searching for the ultimate definition of a distinction
without a difference, it seems one could find it in the revisions made to
military policy as a result of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate.
Halley argues, however, that the present Statute is more "arbitrary,
wide-reaching, and unpredictable" (p. 2) than its predecessor. She
also contends that the Statute's coercive manipulation of status and
conduct against gay servicemembers has its origin in the Justice
Department's disingenuous application of an even more disingenuous
opinion of the Supreme Court.
II. A WAR OF WORDS: STATUS AND CONDUCT
Halley finds the beginning of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in Bowers v.
Hardwick,15 the uniformly criticized decision16 that declined to find any
constitutional right to privacy that would protect two adults of the
same sex from criminal prosecution for consensual sexual intimacy.
"The new regulations . . . translate the rhetoric of that baneful decision
into rules of conduct for everyday life in the military" (p. 5). Halley
14. 10 u.s.c. § 654 (f)(l)-(3).
15. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL.
631, 633.
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explains that Hardwick provided the model for the military's later
manipulation of the status/conduct distinction by refusing to recognize
that the Georgia statute at issue defined sodomy without reference to
the sex of the partners (pp. 7-8). The Court had to deliberately disre
gard the law's application to heterosexual sodomy to justify its deci
sion on the basis of historical animus toward gay people. Only then, as
Halley explains, could a sex-neutral sodomy provision be upheld on
the basis that it "rationally expressed a popular judgment that homo
sexuality was morally wrong" (p. 9). This facile interchange between
conduct and status, according to Halley, is what made Hardwick such
a perfect vehicle for anti-gay military policy. "[T]he Court's logic ap
pears to depend on acts, but actually depends on persons."17
Why the importance of concepts of status and conduct? Legal ma
neuvering over status and conduct with respect to gay servicemembers
actually predates Hardwick,1 8 arising instead from earlier criminal
"status" cases such as Robinson v. California19 and Powell v. Texas.20
Robinson and Powell stand for the proposition that an individual can
not be criminally prosecuted merely for having a "status" such as ad
diction to drugs or to alcohol; a criminal conviction must be based on
specific provable conduct, such as the possession or sale of narcotics or
an incident of public intoxication.21
These criminal status cases have always been a poor fit with mili
tary discrimination cases because proceedings against gay service
members rarely involve criminal charges. Although the Uniform
Code of Military Justice includes a criminal sodomy law22 - applica17. P. 9; see also pp. 71-72 (finding the genesis of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in Hardwick's
"management of the status/conduct distinction"). It may be a stretch to characterize
Hardwick as a "status" case in the same sense that status is employed in cases concerning the
military's exclusionary policy. Halley states that Hardwick provides "an offer of immunity
to anyone willing to identify as heterosexual," p. 10, but that is almost certainly incorrect. A
self-identified heterosexual who engaged, for whatever reason, in an act of same-sex sodomy
would not be immunized from prosecution based on his or her seimal orientation. It would
be more accurate to state that the opinion rewrote the sodomy statute as if it were limited by
biological sex, with sodomy constituting a crime only when committed, for example, by two
males. While Hardwick is factually and legally illogical, based on a "very sloppy, inaccurate,
self-blinding history," p. 9, it does not rely on confusion between status and conduct.
18. See Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Matthews has not chal
lenged the Army's right to disenroll her for her homosexual conduct, but only for her
status . . . ."); Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
("[T]he Army's policy of discharging people simply for having homosexual personalities also
offends privacy interests . . . .").
19. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (reversing criminal conviction for the status of having an addic
tion to narcotics as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment).
20. 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) (upholding criminal convic
tion for public drunkenness; distinguishing Robinson on the basis that defendant engaged in
specific prohibited conduct on a particular occasion).
21. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 532; Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
22. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1994).
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ble to both heterosexual and homosexual conduct - discharges of gay
servicemembers very rarely involve sodomy charges.23 Under the lan
guage of the military's policy governing the administrative discharge
of gay servicemembers, whether before or after the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" revisions, a range of behavior far more comprehensive than an
act of sodomy constitutes a basis for discharge.
More importantly, criminal status cases have been a poor fit be
cause, outside the criminal context, status and conduct can never be
neatly separated from each other. In criminal cases, conduct can be
set apart from status because some particular conduct must always be
specifically identified, charged, and proven. In military discrimination
cases, in contrast, specifically charged conduct is often not at issue.
Status and conduct are not as easily distinguished when, for example,
the controversy concerns proof that a servicemember is not a homo
sexual (under the Old DOD Policy) or has no propensity to engage in
homosexual acts (under the Statute). The practical difficulty of de
fining these elements solely in terms of status, however, has not pre
vented advocates for gay military plaintiffs from forcing an artificial
distinction from conduct in an attempt to establish some status-based
constitutional protection. That effort has contributed to the current
state of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as much as the efforts of those op
posed to the service of gay citizens.
Advocates for gay plaintiffs have traditionally chosen to litigate
pure "statement" cases when challenging the military's exclusionary
policies, for the most part conceding the military's interest in exclud
ing those who engage in, or have an intent or propensity to engage in,
any form of same-sex intimate conduct.24 The battle is drawn on plain
tiffs' contention that a servicemember's gay sexual orientation, or
status, is unrelated to any intent or propensity to engage in gay inti
macy or conduct. As a result, according to this argument, service
members who make statements identifying themselves as gay should

23. See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 756-58, 787 (1993) (testimony of Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Maj. Gen. John T. Otgen, Senior Member, Military Working Group); THEODORE R.
SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS, DEFENSE PERSONNEL SEC. REsEARCH & EDUC. CrR.,
NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MILITARY SUITABILITY 21-22, app. B
(1988), reprinted in GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON'S SECRET REPORTS 27-28, 81-84
(Kate Dyer ed., 1990).
24. One notable exception has been Chai Feldblum, a law professor at Georgetown
University Law Center. See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law:
Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 294 (1996) ("The intense effort on the part of
some gay legal advocates to avoid the Hardwick trap by decoupling sexual orientation from
sexual conduct leads to some Alice-in-Wonderland claims, which might be amusing if the
outcome of the effort were not so potentially destructive."); see also Chandler Burr, Friendly
Fire: How Politics Shaped Policy on Gays in the Military, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 54
(highlighting Professor Feldblum's service as the legal adviser for the Campaign for Military
Service and her singular effort to discourage reliance on a distinction between status and
conduct).
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not be subject to discharge because their statements demonstrate
nothing about the risk that is the military's purported concern: the
risk that same-sex intimacy is more likely to occur within the military
if self-identified gay citizens are permitted to serve.
The fundamental weakness of the status/conduct distinction as
employed in discrimination cases extends beyond its faulty application
to gay servicemembers. Its weakness is that "status" never exists in a
vacuum; it is always defined, at some level, by reference to the conduct
from which it is generated. Halley offers several examples of legal
status akin to sexual orientation, such as husband and wife, serf and
prince, and felon (p. 29). None of these statuses, of course, can be
achieved without some form of associated conduct; one cannot "be" a
husband or wife, for example, without taking part in a ceremony of
marriage and subsequently engaging in the activities of life as a couple
rather than as a single individual. The mistake in adopting a forced
distinction between status and conduct on behalf of gay servicemem
bers is found in the assumption that it is possible to be just metaphysi
cally gay - a sterile, stark orientation or status - and not engage in
conduct, or have any propensity to engage in conduct, that is inextri
cably associated with that status.
In Don t, Halley has a conflicted perspective on the status/conduct
distinction as employed in military discrimination cases. She does rec
ognize the absurdity of arguing that statements of sexual orientation
are irrelevant to military judgments concerning future sexual behavior
when she writes that:
While it might have been plausible for [plaintiffs] to claim that a
servicemember should not be discharged on the basis of conduct for
which there is no proof, it is quite a different matter to claim that his or
her self-description as "homosexual" refers to "status" alone and has
nothing to do with homosexual conduct. [p.62]
At the same time, however, she lapses into frustration over the legal
consequences of practical reality, characterizing any suggestion that
statements concerning sexual orientation are indicative of propensity
for conduct as "merest supposition" (p. 113) or "freewheeling law
yering" (pp. 138-39 n.12). "The overarching mechanism of the new
military anti-gay policy is not status or conduct, but a newly volatile,
artifactual relationship between them" (p. 126).
As much as Halley criticizes the military's interpretation of the re
lationship between status and conduct, she seems to admit that the
concepts cannot be separated. Her objection may be instead that the
status/conduct distinction, initially employed by advocates for gay
plaintiffs despite its artificiality, was ultimately turned around and
used to construct an equally irrational "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime
that left no realistic window for military service by gay citizens. Halley
aptly captures the centrality of "propensity" to this exclusionary ef
fort, a concept that highlights the link between status and conduct and
'
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allows the military to sweep a "truly startling" (p. 108) range of be
havior within the scope of the Statute.
Halley saves particular criticism for the Statute's use of propensity
as a disqualification for military service. Recall that, under the
Statute, a servicemember who makes a statement that he or she is gay
must disprove any propensity to engage in same-sex intimacy to avoid
discharge. Halley argues that this burden, also termed the "opportu
nity to rebut" (p. 86), is unfair to the servicemember because propen
sity "is an ambiguous term, referring just as much to homosexual
status as to homosexual acts" (p. 16). While Halley is correct that
propensity is well described as a hybrid of status and conduct, it is
hardly ambiguous. The status of being gay (an issue under the Old
DOD Policy) can reasonably be described as comprising a propensity
to engage in the conduct of same-sex intimacy (the substituted linguis
tic focus of the Statute) .25 Taking the reverse perspective, having a
propensity to engage in certain behavior is just another way of de
scribing one's orientation or status. The terms of the Statute are nei
ther "new" (p. 57) nor a "novelty" (p. 66); they are merely the playing
pieces of word games designed to exclude the same servicemembers as
before while creating the appearance of concern for conduct rather
than status.
It is ironic that Halley complains of the unfairness of having to
prove a negative: proof that an individual has no propensity for same
sex intimacy despite his or her self-identification as gay. This burden
was the inevitable end point of a litigation strategy on behalf of gay
servicemembers arguing that statements of status indicated nothing
about propensity for conduct.26 The military may have discovered an
advantage in co-opting this strategy and asking that gay servicemem
bers be forced to prove what their lawyers had always insisted was
true. The strategy backfired, of course, once plaintiffs realized that
they now carried the burden of proving something that was always in
herently ridiculous. It should not be surprising that attempts by gay

25. One need not believe that "status define[s] conduct" or that "the possibility of con
duct was conclusive proof of its actuality," p. 85, to accept that sexual orientation serves as a
means to describe propensity for conduct. Professor Halley has employed this common
sense understanding of sexual orientation in an earlier analysis of sexual identity issues. See
Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989). "Thus, 'gays' and 'gay men and lesbians'
refer to people who have acknowledged, at least to themselves, that their sexual desires or
practices are often, predominantly, or entirely homoerotic." Id. at 916 n.5.

26. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) ("Nevertheless,
Steffan, in order to make his point, would have us see homosexual status - which is all that
he should be thought to have acknowledged - as conceptually unrelated to homosexual
conduct.") (affirming 1987 discharge under pre-"Don't ASk, Don't Tell" regulations).

1600
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servicemembers to disprove any propensity to lead gay lives have been
largely unsuccessful.27
The disaster of relying on a distinction between status and conduct
demonstrates the danger of crafting legal arguments without reference
to practical consequence. Once status and conduct were outlined as
nonoverlapping entities, unrelated to and uncorrelated with each
other, it became a much smaller step for the military narrowly to de·
fine "mere status" as some imperceptible state of being. Conven·
iently, as soon as status becomes perceptible, it potentially becomes
conduct subject to the military's control. By rigidly defining status as
"not conduct," and conduct as "not status," status itself could be
drained of all significance. Halley recognizes the military's theft and
redeployment of the status/conduct distinction, noting that "[c]onduct
is, at least in a military context, always public while status is an inner
and hence potentially secret characteristic of persons" (p. 30). She
fails, however, to assign responsibility for its creation. Both sides at·
tempted to win points with irrationality; an irrational policy should
have been a foreseeable result.
III. THE DANGERS OF ISOLATIONISM:

LAW OUT OF CONTEXT

To understand the "legal discourses" of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
Halley counsels the reader to "pay attention to the peculiarities of par·
ticular institutional settings" (pp. 11·12). Left unstated in her history,
however, is the fact that advocates for gay servicemembers have made
little effort to understand the military institutional setting within which
the exclusionary policy has operated both before and after "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell." Given the historical bias against the military and
military service held by gay advocacy groups,28 it is likely that this ex·
periential gap contributed to litigation choices that, in the long run,
were counterproductive to the cause.
Why, for example, did the policy that emerged from the debate
center on notions of "Don't Ask" and "Don't Tell"? The Statute is
asymmetrically silent with respect to "Don't Ask"; its benefits, such as
27. See pp. 99-105. Halley also notes with disapproval that the most successful rebuttal
strategy to counter the presumption of propensity arising from a servicemember's statement
that he or she is gay has been the production of evidence that the servicemember is, in fact,
fundamentally heterosexual. These "affirmations of heterosexual status" would demon
strate, in essence, that the original statement was an incorrect self-characterization. P. 100.
Halley believes this is an inappropriate distinction based on status, but in what other way
could a servicemember rebut a propensity for gay conduct, when gay orientation is just an
other way to describe a propensity for gay conduct?
28. See pp. 23-24; see also Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays
in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223, 272 (1996) [hereinaf
ter Mazur, Unknown Soldier] ("While [gay activists] realized the importance of equal access
to the performance of public service, military service was not the kind of public service they
were interested in performing." (footnote omitted)).
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they are, are found within implementing regulations by the
Department of Defense. First, new recruits are no longer asked at in
duction whether they are gay or have engaged in same-sex intimacy.29
Second, current servicemembers should be questioned only if a com
mander has "credible information that there is a basis for discharge"
under the Statute - something more than "rumor, suspicion, or capri
cious claims" or "the opinions of others" that a servicemember is
gay.30 Halley concludes that President Clinton made a very poor trade
when he acceded to "Don't Tell" in exchange for the relatively trivial
benefits of "Don't Ask." "[W]hat he did not anticipate was that be
tween 'don't ask' and 'don't tell' lay ample territory for anti-gay
status-based regulation" (p. 48).
The military's determination to eliminate any opportunity for
"telling" is in part the continuation of a policy that already prohibited
statements of self-identification by gay servicemembers. More signifi
cantly, however, the military's focus on the importance of "Don't
Tell" was likely a reaction to the nature of test cases advanced by gay
servicemembers. By the time of the national conversation concerning
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the standard legal challenge to the exclu
sionary policy had taken the form of a "pure status" claim, initiated by
a servicemember's public announcement that he was gay.31
Halley observes that the "chief unresolved issue" in drafting revi
sions to the policy was "whether the military could discharge service
members who had engaged in no provable same-sex erotic acts but
who stated that they were gay" (p. 70). This issue received the most
attention, however, only because advocates had been framing their
claims in terms of latitude for public announcement, a context that
was unrepresentative of the manner in which the policy routinely af-

29. See Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction, DOD Di
rective 1304.26, enclosure 1.2.8.1 (Dec. 21, 1993) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil>. This procedural
change, however, was the smallest of concessions by the military, carrying no practical con
sequence whatsoever. I doubt the induction questions were effective in excluding any gay
citizens from the military; everyone, obviously, answers in the negative.
30. Enlisted Administrative Separations (Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries into Ho
mosexual Conduct), DOD Directive 1332.14, enclosure 3.A4.1.3.l, enclosure 3.A4.1.3.3.3
(Dec. 21, 1993) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil> [hereinafter Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquir
ies]. Similar provisions control the discharge of officer personnel. See Separation ofRegular
Commissioned Officers, DOD Directive 1332.30 (Dec. 21, 1993) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil>.
31. I use the non-gender-neutral "he" deliberately, because the standard legal chal
lenges at the time were all filed on behalf of male servicemembers. See Meinhold v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (statement made to ABC's "World
News Tonight"); Thome v. United States Dep't of Defense, 945 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Va.
1996) (statement made to ABC's "Nightline"), affd per curiam, No. 97-1121, 1998 WL
163632 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 371 (1998); Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F. Supp.
439 (D.D.C. 1993) (statement made to ABC's "World News Tonight"). Other servicemem
bers' challenges were based on oral or written declarations to their commanders. See
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md.
1995), affd per curiam and mem., 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996).
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fected the lives of gay servicemembers. Advocates could have chosen
instead to defend servicemembers who had been discharged after dis
covery that they, like their heterosexual colleagues, led lives that in
cluded intimacy, but those cases were largely disregarded because they
failed to fit within artificial parameters that required a bare statement
of self-identification coupled with a denial (however incredible) of in
terest in intimacy.32 As Halley notes, "advocates are under rhetorical
constraints that make such an assertion of a right to status protection
almost de rigueur" (p. 116).
Once Congress became obsessed with the revelations gay service
members might make about themselves in a military context, the dis
cussion shifted to the military's investigatory interest in the discovery
and deterrence of this prohibited "telling." Unfortunately, when in
vestigations can be initiated on the basis of any information more sub
stantive than mere rumor, suspicion, or opinion, a simple failure of se
crecy may become indistinguishable from "telling." Perhaps this
threshold of required evidence provides some limited protection
against the most indiscriminate intrusions, but it still leaves gay
servicemembers with the impossible obligation to maintain complete
secrecy concerning the routine nature of what they do, where they go,
and whom they see, far exceeding the scope of information more di
rectly associated with intimate behavior. Kay Kavanagh has elo
quently explained why the policy's prohibition of statements con
cerning sexual orientation is not its most intrusive burden: "Rather, it
involves making truly unremarkable disclosures, such as with whom
one goes grocery shopping, shares a checking account, takes a vaca
tion . . . ; from whom one receives a phone call, a message, or flowers
on one's birthday; and with or without whom one goes home for the
holidays."33
Advocates for gay servicemembers have never completely under
stood the consequences of their decision to favor public statements of
orientation over the inescapably ordinary conduct of everyday life conduct that is almost always private but almost never secret. Lati
tude for public announcement offers nothing to gay servicemembers if
unaccompanied by latitude for the routine indicia of intimate life.
Status protection can shield only the most superficial of statements;
matters of greater significance will inevitably be construed as conduct
subject to investigation.

32 See Mazur, Unknown Soldier, supra note 28, at 231-32 (discussing Walmer v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1995), in which a female officer was dis
charged four years prior to retirement after her partner in a previous long-term relationship
reported their involvement to the Army).
33. Kay Kavanagh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 142, 154 (1995).
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One of the weaknesses of advocacy on behalf of gay servicemem
bers under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a tendency to exaggerate the
irrationality of the policy, and Don't succumbs to that same tempta
tion. Exaggeration is hardly necessary, as the policy is quite irrational
on its own. Unfortunately, hyperbole can take the place of considered
criticism, just as the semantics of status and conduct took the place of
attention to practical consequence in devising litigation strategy.
As an example, Halley mischaracterizes the difference between
conduct that, under DOD regulation, can trigger an investigation and
conduct that, under the Statute, can constitute a basis for discharge.
Conduct that can trigger an investigation comprises a much broader
category than conduct that warrants discharge, in the same sense that
the scope of information subject to discovery is broader than the scope
of evidence admissible at trial. Discharges must be based on prohib
ited statements or conduct, while investigations designed to discover
prohibited statements or conduct can be initiated solely on the basis of
credible information tending to suggest a servicemember's propensity
for same-sex intimacy.
Halley is absolutely correct to criticize a regulatory scheme that
permits commanders to initiate an investigation "on the basis of con
duct that makes them think a servicemember is gay" (p. 110). This is
the very reason that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is no different in scope
from its earlier, presumably more status-based, version.34 It takes a
good point too far, however, to allege that the military is actually dis
charging people on the basis of behavior that merely "looks gay" (pp.
2; 5; 51-52; 109; 115). No discharge proceeding under "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" has ever imposed a burden to disprove propensity for
same-sex intimacy on any basis other than the servicemember's verbal
or written statement to the effect of "I am gay." Therefore, it is ex
tremely misleading to suggest, for example, that servicemembers can
34. "Credible information" justifying further investigation includes a report of "behav
ior that amounts to a non-verbal statement by a member that he or she is a homosex
ual . . . ." Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries, supra note 30, at enclosure 3.A4.l.3.4.3. The
potentially limitless range of pedestrian behavior that would be probative of a servicemem
ber's intimate life is, paradoxically, restricted only by an express exemption for some of the
most stereotypically gay (and disproportionately male) associational activity, such as going
to gay bars, reading gay magazines, and marching in gay rights parades. "Such activity, in
and of itself, does not provide evidence of homosexual conduct." Id. at enclosure
3.A4.l.3.3.4. In her congressional testimony, Jamie Gorelick, General Counsel for the
Department of Defense, emphasized that commanders in the field would have the discretion
to determine whether information was sufficiently credible to initiate an investigation, par
ticularly under "gray area" circumstances not specifically addressed by regulation. See As
sessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the
Military Forces and Personnel Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 103d
Cong. 178-79 (1993) [hereinafter House Military Forces Hearings]. The nature of the con
duct that would justify the initiation of a factual investigation by a commander is perhaps the
most important aspect of how "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" will affect gay servicemembers on a
routine basis. Once an investigation begins, given enough interest, time, and effort, it is
likely that disqualifying statements or conduct will be discovered.
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be discharged for the style of their haircuts or their failure to fit the
expected gender stereotype (p. 2). Such hyperbole obscures the effort
to explain how the policy impacts servicemembers on a routine and
not a test-case basis.35
Exaggerations of the way in which the policy operates inevitably
lead to assertions that, by association, weaken credible arguments.
One strategy is to contend that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" will result in
discharges of heterosexual servicemembers, presumably justifying re
form either because the Statute is inaccurate in its identification of gay
individuals or, more realistically, because the Statute is now harming
citizens of concern to the military. Halley speculates, for example,
that "[w]hen a commander thinks that women who want to serve in
the military are probably lesbians, every act of every woman in that
unit manifests a propensity" (p. 5) and that "few servicemembers can
possibly be so unambiguously straight that they will never wonder
whether a reasonable person might construe their actions as homosex
ual conduct" (p. 118).
Advocates have consistently failed to offer representative exam
ples of how the exclusionary policy most commonly affects gay
servicemembers, so Don't cannot be entirely faulted for following that
lead. These arguments are harmful, however, not only because there
is absolutely no evidence that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is leading to
discharges of straight servicemembers,36 but also because they trivial
ize the effect the policy actually does have on gay servicemembers.
When people lead heterosexual lives their everyday behavior rou
tinely tends to indicate a propensity for heterosexual conduct and rou
tinely tends to immunize them from scrutiny under "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell. "37 The reason that gay servicemembers are so severely affected
35. What is the benefit, for example, of raising spurious allegations that the military
violates "Don't Ask" restrictions when advocates could instead focus on actual violations or,
even more productively, highlight the unconscionable effect of the Statute even when ap
plied according to its terms? Halley criticizes the military for questioning servicemembers
about their sexual status and conduct after they had already made public statements ac
knowledging that they were gay. See pp. 50-51, 113-14. The original idea was, of course,
"Don't Ask," not "Don't Ever Ask." It is certainly a lesser intrusion, and one authorized by
the regulatory scheme, to "ask" once a servicemember has already violated the Statute by
making a statement.
36. See Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 52-54 (1999)
[hereinafter Mazur, A Call to Arms] (examining the assumption that servicemen frequently
retaliate against servicewomen who refuse their sexual advances by threatening their careers
with accusations of homosexuality).
37. See Melissa S. Herbert, Guarding the Nation, Guarding Ourselves: The Management
of Hetero/Homo/Sexuality Among Women in the Military, 15 MINERVA: Q. REP. ON
WOMEN & MIL. 60 (1997) <http://www.softlineweb.com/bin/KaStasGw.exe?k_a=nscmqt.1.
searchwin.W> (surveying whether female servicemembers and veterans, both gay and
straight, had altered their behavior while in the military to avoid accusations of homosexual
ity; finding that only one in ten straight women engaged in behavior designed to create an
aura of heterosexuality, while five in ten gay women did so). "Although homophobia affects
all women, there is no reason we would expect a significant number of heterosexual women

May 2000]

Word Games, War Games

1605

by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is that the most routine aspects of their
everyday conduct will eventually reveal credible information that they
do, in fact, lead gay lives. When legal arguments emphasize theoreti
cal harms to straight servicemembers rather than pragmatic conse
quences for gay servicemembers, they blur the actual reach of the
policy and dilute the strength of arguments for its revision or repeal.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISCRETION
There is no question that the environment in which gay citizens
perform military service has grown more burdensome and more intru
sive in the years since the enactment of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." The
more difficult question is why this circumstance has come to be.
Halley finds the cause in subtle revisions to the language of the mili
tary's exclusionary policy that now permit the manipulative exercise of
military discretion (p. 107). This legalistic perspective, however one that had to be stretched to identify even small semantic differ
ences - prevents consideration of larger institutional influences that
shape the way in which the policy operates in practice. Perhaps it is
the special weakness of lawyers to focus on the significance of words
to the exclusion of context, but in this instance that weakness has
made it more difficult to construct a persuasive case for reform.
An analogy based on a comparison of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" to
the small number of remaining criminal statutes prohibiting adultery
may illustrate this distinction between language and institutional con
text. The handful of state adultery statutes not yet repealed are obso
lete and no longer enforced; the military's adultery prohibition, how
ever, is still actively prosecuted.38 If one were interested in examining
the comparative burden that these statutes impose on the sexual lives
of citizens of various jurisdictions, the most significant factor for study
probably would not be any subtle drafting differences in how these
crimes were statutorily defined. The far more significant factor in as
sessing comparative burden would be the degree to which, and the
manner in which, the statutes were enforced. Two statutes that de
fined adultery in different ways, but were equally without enforce
ment, would impose equally negligible burdens. Two identically
drafted statutes, however, would impose very different burdens on
citizens if one was enforced and the other was not.
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is analogous in that the exclusionary pol
icy has been subject to great variation in discretionary enforcement.

to be so sensitive to this fact that they would consciously work to avoid such labeling. It may
be that their everyday behaviors are enough to allay suspicions." Id. at 72.
38. See C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters but Should Marriage?: Adultery, Fraterniza
tion, and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177 (1999); Major William T. Barto,
The Scarlet Letter and the Military Justice System, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1997, at 3.

1606

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1590

Much as it may be a surprise to advocates whose first exposure to the
policy came in the era of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the military has in
the recent past exerdsed a significant amount of discretion in nonen
forcement of the policy. This is not to suggest, of course, that gay
servicemembers were unaffected by their official exclusion, but rather
that the policy was leavened during the previous generation by a sig
nificant level of awareness of the service of gay citizens and a signifi
cant degree of sentiment that the policy should not be enforced.
Randy Shilts's Conduct Unbecoming'9 illustrates the conflicted
combination of widespread nonenforcement and sporadic over
enforcement of the policy that characterized the era between the
Vietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts.40 Shilts documents the not un
common understanding of both commissioned and noncommissioned
officers that the gay servicemembers within their units were necessary
to the mission and that it would be counterproductive to seek their
discharge. As just one of a number of examples,41 Shilts cites the ex
perience of one former Pentagon official who found consistently
strong support for reversal of the exclusionary policy throughout the
senior officer and enlisted ranks during his presentations on Air Force
bases, under circumstances in which public posturing was unneces
sary.42 It was also not particularly uncommon during this era for sen
ior officers to recognize implicitly the gay partners of servicemembers
and include them in social events.43 Enforcement of the exclusionary
policy was driven much more by individual predilection or bias than
institutional understanding.
This is the institutional discretion we have lost in the era of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," a discretion that historically has been found not in
the policy's language but in its nonenforcement. The reason we see
tremendous increases in the numbers of gay servicemembers dis
charged after the enactment of a policy that was presumably designed
to provide some small window of opportunity for service is because
the military now operates with a clear institutional mandate of full,
even obsessive, enforcement.
Halley's work does examine the military's use of discretion, but
she searches for the source of that discretion within the language of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" rather than within the institution itself. Her
statutory analysis disregards the reality that the military is an inher39. RANDY SHILTS,
MILITARY (1993).

CONDUCT

UNBECOMING:

LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S.

40. The discretionary enforcement of the policy might be compared to the danger of
being hit by lightning. While it was statistically unlikely that an individual gay servicemem
ber would be hit, if that servicemember was hit, he or she was really going to get burned.
41. See SHILTS, supra note 39, at 236, 307-11, 389, 531-39, 645.
42 See id. at 460.
43. See id. at 532-34.
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ently discretionary world, with a commander's discretion nearly sacro
sanct; the degree of discretion exercised outside the language of mili
tary law will certainly exceed that exercised within it.
Halley overestimates the relationship between statutory language
and the exercise of military discretion when, for example, she criticizes
the Statute's "starkly different procedural tracks for personnel ac
cused of same-sex sodomy and those accused of cross-sex consensual
sodomy" (pp. 37-38). In an effort to ameliorate what was perhaps the
most severe application of the exclusionary policy, the military agreed
as part of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" that it would no longer refer for
criminal prosecution - and potential imprisonment - allegations of
consensual sodomy between individuals of the same sex. Instead the
matter would be handled as an administrative violation justifying dis
charge under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."44
This shift from "a formally neutral procedure," under which both
heterosexual and homosexual servicemembers would theoretically be
subject to criminal prosecution for sodomy, to "an explicitly discrimi
natory one," under which commanders can make a discretionary
choice to retain heterosexual violators, draws Halley's criticism (p.
38). But certainly she could not have preferred the alternative. This
revision does not establish "starkly different procedural tracks"; it
continues the long-standing discretionary understanding of nonen
forcement against heterosexual violators of the sodomy law. "Proce
dure" cannot be a relevant factor when allegations of consensual het
erosexual sodomy are nonexistent and commanders are never asked to
make conscious decisions whether to prosecute those violations. Het
erosexual sodomy is not protected by a procedural privilege; it is pro
tected by an accepted practice of nonenforcement.
Similarly, Halley charges that the Statute provides an explicitly
status-based, procedural privilege for self-identifying heterosexuals to
engage in homosexual intimate conduct (p. 39). Halley refers to a
provision of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" carried forward from its prede
cessor that allows a servicemember to be retained despite having en
gaged in same-sex intimacy if the conduct "is a departure from the
member's usual and customary behavior," "is unlikely to recur," and
"was not accomplished by use of force"; the servicemember's reten
tion is consistent with "proper discipline, good order, and morale";
and the servicemember "does not have a propensity or intent to en
gage in homosexual acts."45 Halley argues that this procedural privi
lege "protects heterosexual persons from any status-like consequences
of their homosexual acts" (pp. 46-47).
44. See Investigations of Sexual Misconduct by the Defense Criminal Investigative Or
ganizations and Other DOD Law Enforcement Organizations, DOD Instruction 5505.8 (Feb.
28, 1994) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil>.
45. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(l)(A)-(E) (1994).
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This provision is a common focus of criticism for advocates chal
lenging the policy.46 Why should self-identified heterosexuals be per
mitted to engage in same-sex intimacy if that conduct is detrimental in
a military environment? One could question how large a problem the
military has with self-identified heterosexuals seeking protection for
their same-sex intimate conduct. But even disregarding this particular
logical weakness, Halley fails to cite a single instance in which this
statutory defense has been applied. The likelihood that servicemem
bers who engage in same-sex intimacy will be able to convince the
military that they are, in fact, heterosexual is almost nil.47 "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" actually provides a certain linguistic symmetry (in contrast
to Halley's charge of "subtle asymmetry" (p. 47)) in its treatment of
prohibited statements and conduct. In both cases, the opportunity to
demonstrate a lack of propensity for same-sex intimacy leaves a statu
tory window for retention of gay servicemembers that is technically
open but practically closed.
The statutory revisions to the military's exclusionary policy leading
to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" are irrelevant to the deterioration of the
conditions under which gay servicemembers live. The policy has not
changed; the military has changed, and for two reasons. First, the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate itself changed the nature of the mili
tary. For the duration of the winter, spring, and summer of 1993, the
military held, in effect, an institutional "teach in" that conveyed to its
members the complete incompatibility of homosexuality with military
service and the importance of discovering and expelling gay service
members within their midst. Statements by some of the military's
most respected representatives contributed to an atmosphere of fear,
disgust, and violence,48 and the recent tragedy in which a young Army
enlisted man was beaten to death by his fellow servicemembers simply
46. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) (Wald, J.,
dissenting); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 n.11 (9th Cir.
1994) ("However, DOD is prepared to take the risk that a servicemember who has commit
ted a homosexual act but isn't homosexual won't do so again. For that reason, its argument
is not wholly rational.").
47. The exception is probably intended to apply to circumstances in which the consen
sual or intentional nature of the sexual conduct is unclear. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the
Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing, in dicta, intoxication, youth, and undue
influence as relevant factors under an earlier, but analogous, exception to the rnilitary's ex
clusionary policy).
48. See Mazur, Re-Making Distinctions on the Basis of Sex: Must Gay Women Be
Admitted to the Military Even If Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 953, 983-91 (1997).
Ultimately, it was the personal animus that straight servicemembers held for their gay col
leagues that formed the most effective legal justification for the exclusionary policy. "The
armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence in the
armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of mo
rale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."
10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (1994). No court, however, has ever questioned the degree to which
the military fostered the very climate it would use to justify "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."
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because they thought he was gay49 can fairly be seen as the continuing
legacy of the strategy of animus the military employed.50 The very ex
istence of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a continuing lesson for young
servicemembers that their gay colleagues have no place within the
military.
Second, research indicates that the military has become less and
less politically representative of civilian society over the last twenty
years.51 With the end of military conscription now one generation
past, we have lost the draft-era officers and enlisted men that made
the military a much more representative force. In its place we have a
military in which young officers are increasingly "hard-right
Republican, largely comfortable with the views of Rush Limbaugh,"52
an ideological shift that is more extreme in degree than the increasing
conservatism of American society as a whole. The increasingly parti
san conservatism of today's military is remarkable in that it has devel
oped despite the greater representation of women, and alarming in
that political neutrality was once a professional ethic of military offi
cers. "On the face of it, a large military that is becoming more politi
cally active at the same time that it is increasingly concentrated on one
end of the partisan and ideological spectrum is a cause for concem."53
Given this convergence of social conservatism and military culture, the
military's fundamental(ist) resistance to national service by gay citi
zens is unsurprising. The disappointment is that we may have been
politically closer to an acceptance of the contribution of gay service
members twenty years ago than we are today.

49. See Francis X. Clines, For Gay Soldier, a Daily Barrage of Threats and Slurs, N.Y.
Dec. 12, 1999, § 1, at 33.

TIMES,

50. There is some hope that this animus could diminish when the military no longer re
minds servicemembers quite so often of the dangers presented by the presence of gay col
leagues. According to periodic surveys taken by Professors Charles Moskos and Laura
Miller, opposition to military service by gay citizens has steadily declined in the years since
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell." The percentage of male servicemembers who "strongly disagree"
with a proposal to end the exclusionary policy has declined precipitously from 62% in April
1992 to 36% in August 1998. The percentage of men who are "not sure" whether gay
servicemembers should be admitted or excluded has almost quadrupled, from 6% in April
1992 to 22% in August 1998. See Charles Moskos & Laura L. Miller, Nomandom Surveys of
Army Personnel (1998) (unpublished survey data, on file with the Michigan Law Review).
51. See OLE R. HOLST!, A WIDENING GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CMLIAN
SOCIETY? SOME EVIDENCE, 1976-1996 (Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Rela
tions Working Paper No. 13, 1997). The increasing ideological gap between the United
States military and the society it is sworn to protect has become such a matter of concern
that the October 1999 biennial conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces
and Society, the preeminent association dedicated to military research and scholarship, de
voted two panels to the topic ("The Role of Institutions in the Civil-Military Culture Gap";
"What Is the U.S. Civil-Military Gap and What Does It Matter?").
52. THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKING THE CORPS 280 (1997); see also Mazur, A Call to Arms,
supra note 36 (arguing that increased distance between feminists and the military has con
tributed to a less representative military).
53. HOLST!, supra note 51, at 18.

1610

Michigan Law Review

V.

(Vol. 98:1590

CONCLUSION: FINDING IRRATIONALITY

The solution to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" may be, in a sense, as in
stitutional as the problem. Even though these legislative revisions
amounted to a distinction without a difference with respect to the
scope of the policy as applied, the road to improvement is no less a le
gal one. Halley believes that the most significant opportunity for a re
versal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is in a judicial finding that "it is irra
tional to protect against conduct-based harm to military effectiveness
when homosexuals engage in the conduct but not when heterosexuals
do, or when open homosexuals rather than closeted ones commit it"
(p. 128). There is no shortage of what could be found lacking in ra
tional basis under an equal protection challenge to the policy, and
Halley reviews several of the most likely possibilities: the idea that
unit cohesion is somehow strengthened by the "legitimation of
servicemembers' homophobic sensibilities"; that privacy is somehow
protected by "secretive homosexual presence"; or that exclusion is
somehow justified as an "accommodation[] to existing anti-gay ani
mus" (pp. 128-29).
What Halley does not measure, however, is the influence of institu
tional deference. The military has been the beneficiary of an extraor
dinary level of judicial deference to its professional judgment in mat
ters of national defense and military affairs.54 The Supreme Court, for
example, stated:

[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a mili
tary force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always
to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.55
Every judicial decision upholding the constitutionality of the military's
exclusionary policy has relied on this obligation of deference in cred
iting the military's proffered justifications;56 it may be the single most
important factor that prevents significant judicial review.
No one has ever questioned, however, whether the military's com
petence with respect to the service of gay citizens is any greater than,
or even equal to, that of the courts. The military's assertion of profes
sional judgment has never been questioned and the scope of military

54. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981).
55. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (finding no justiciable controversy with
respect to claim seeking judicial evaluation and supervision of Ohio National Guard training
and operations following the Kent State incident).
56. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632-34 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v.
California Army Nat'! Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 F.3d 794
(1999); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915, 925-27 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(en bane).
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competence has never been defined; it is almost as if any subject in
which the military asserts an interest becomes one in which the mili
tary enjoys special competence.57 With respect to the service of gay
citizens, however, the military has demonstrated a particular lack of
competence.
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the
time "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was adopted, revealed a breathtaking
depth of ignorance when he testified to his belief that in three decades
in the military he had never served with a gay servicemember - ex
cept for those who had been discovered and discharged.58 It is very
difficult to reconcile General Powell's deliberate ignorance (or un
truthfulness) with any judicial conclusion that the military deserves
deference on the basis of its professional competence.59 The military
purports to understand the effect that gay servicemembers have on
mission effectiveness even though it drives the routine lives of those
individuals underground and fosters fear and misunderstanding as a
substitute. The military's professional judgment with respect to gay
servicemembers has not been complex, subtle, or professional; there is
perhaps no institution with less competence on the subject.

57. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986) (Brennan J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If a branch of the military declares one of its rules sufficiently im
portant to outweigh a service person's constitutional rights, it seems that the Court will ac
cept that conclusion, no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be.").
58. See House Military Forces Hearings, supra note 34, at 62 (testimony of Gen. Colin
Powell) ("I do not know any who were not discharged in the course of their service. I don't
personaJiy know of any who completed service."). Three other members of the Joint Chiefs
professed a similar level of ignorance. See id.
59. General Powell's testimony was not challenged during the hearing, and it is possible
that he sincerely believes he has never personally known a gay servicemember who has
completed a term of military service. Given the tens of thousands of servicemembers with
whom General Powell would have had some level of personal contact during his distin
guished career, however, I find his testimony incredible - and convenient. Had General
Powell admitted he knowingly served with gay people, he would have had to explain why he
failed to seek their discharge, given his stated belief that open awareness of homosexuality is
detrimental to military effectiveness.
My personal experience in military service during the late 1970s and early 1980s is that
the vast majority of servicemembers were well aware of the sexual orientation of at least
some of their gay colleagues. Recent statements by presidential candidate (and former naval
aviator) John McCain are consistent with my experience. McCain noted in a very matter-of
fact fashion that he served with a number of gay people in the military. He explained that he
was aware of that ordinary reality during his years of service because "we know by behavior
and by attitudes." "I think that it's clear to some of us when some people have that lifestyle."
Mike Allen, McCain Says He Can Identify Gays By Behavior, Attitudes, WASH. POST, Jan.
18, 2000, at A4; see also Scott Shuger, The Mark of McCain, SLATE MAG., Jan. 18, 2000,
available in LEXI S, News Library, News Group File (interpreting McCain's statement to
mean that "gaydar is pretty much universal").
McCain's statements underscore the difficulty for gay servicemembers under "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell." The same ordinary behavior that informed him some of his colleagues
were gay would constitute "credible information " warranting investigation by the military.
See Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries, supra note 30, at enclosure 3.A4.1.3.4.3.
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Judicial deference to military policy decisions should be inappro
priate under circumstances in which the "professional competence" at
issue is derived from little more than assumptions about the charac
teristic behavior of groups of people. Professional judgment with re
spect to matters of a military nature has had a questionable history
when based on predictions concerning how certain groups of people
will most likely behave or how significantly their predicted behavior
will affect military readiness.
Korematsu v. United States00 is the infamous example. The military
chose a policy of internment for American citizens of Japanese ances
try based on a professional judgment that some might contribute to
the Japanese war effort. Another professional judgment concerning
military readiness was upheld in Rostker v. Goldberg,61 in which
Congress concluded that women would be of insufficient utility in a
war effort to justify their registration for the draft. Without the pro
tection of judicial deference that excuses military decisionmaking from
any serious review, courts would be significantly more likely to discuss
openly the irrationalities of professional judgment under "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell."
When causation is institutional in origin, the solution is likely insti
tutional as well. The word games that resulted in "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" failed to engage more fundamental questions of why the place of
gay citizens within the military is eroding and why the lives of gay
servicemembers are more difficult. Those word games also failed to
engage the manner in which the military itself is changing. If citizens
who serve in the military are becoming less and less politically repre
sentative of the citizens they protect and more partisanly conservative
in their influence, the consequences are important not only for gay
servicemembers but for women in the military as well. If a critical ex
amination of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" leads to reconsideration of how
we as a society choose who will serve in the military and the conditions
under which those citizens serve, a broken policy might someday be
seen as the beginning of positive reform.

60. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
61. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

